Although George W. Bush has performed magnificently on many fronts since
September 11, his war on terrorism has a fatal flaw: it gives Israel short
shrift.
To date, Bush's diplomatic efforts have focused on building what the State
Department Web site calls a "Global Coalition Against Terrorism." Naturally,
this coalition must reach beyond America's historic allies; for example, Bush
has gone to great lengths to forge a close relationship with Russian president
Vladimir Putin. But special efforts have been made with Arab nations, including
Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Seymour Hersh, writing in last week's New
Yorker, reported that America was going to accept Saudi Arabia's refusal to
trace the ties of Saudi Arabian terror suspects. For the first time, the
Pentagon has agreed to sell F-16 jets to the Gulf State of Oman. And some in
the administration want to enlist the governments of the Palestinian Authority,
Syria, and even Iran in the war on terrorism -- this though both Syria and Iran
are still on the list of nations that sponsor terrorism themselves.
But that's not all President Bush has done to appease Arab nations. Less than a
month after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon,
word leaked out of Washington that the administration planned a major new
Middle East initiative: it would call for a Palestinian state. The creation of
a Palestinian state is a noble goal, one that Israel and the Palestinians have
been working toward for years. But the timing of the leak could not have been
worse.
By allowing it to be known that he intended to push for a Palestinian state,
Bush made it look as if America would be responding to terrorist attacks --
attacks committed by a radical sect of Islamists who hold among their goals the
elimination of Israel -- by acceding to the terrorists' demands that American
foreign policy change. In other words, he appeared to be rewarding terror, not
fighting it. It's what the United States did in Beirut when it evacuated the
region after the bombing of a Marine base in 1983. It's what the United
States did when it agreed with Libya's Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi to try two
suspects in the Pan Am 103 bombing (men who were believed to be low-level
operatives) at the Hague -- and forgo pursuing the true masterminds of the
bombing, higher up in the Libyan regime and possibly in other states.
At the same time, Bush seemed to be publicly brushing aside a country that is
not just America's closest ally in the Middle East but the one most experienced
in dealing with terrorism. (Even Massachusetts Governor Jane Swift and her
cronies at Massport turned to an Israeli, Rafi Ron -- who was until recently
the head of security for the Israel Airport Authority -- when they wanted to
show the Massachusetts public they were serious about fighting terrorism.) By
dissing Israel in such a public way, the Bush administration satisfied the
wishes of the al-Saud regime of Saudi Arabia, which has long advocated that the
United States pressure Israel to make more concessions in the Palestinian
conflict. That may keep the Saudi regime happy -- and in the coalition. But it
holds disastrous long-term consequences for the American war on terror.
Not surprisingly, Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon, who is not popular in
the US and is even less popular around the world, responded with horror to the
Bush administration's plan. "Do not appease the Arabs at our expense," Sharon
said. "Israel will not be Czechoslovakia. Israel will fight terrorism."
Sharon's statement was impolitic at best, inflammatory at worst. Even so, the
US response was disturbing. "The president believes that these remarks are
unacceptable," Bush spokesman Ari Fleischer announced, using the same word that
British foreign minister Jack Straw had employed to describe a Taliban proposal
to hand over bin Laden. The rhetorical flare-up left some observers wondering
whether the White House really meant to suggest that Israel was an unfriendly
nation that should be treated on the same terms as the Taliban.
Whether the administration meant to imply that or not, we know one thing. A war
on terrorism that favors an unwieldy Arab coalition at Israel's expense -- or,
worse, a war on terrorism that somehow equates Israel with the enemy -- is
doomed. History proves it.
IF THE Persian Gulf War taught us anything, it taught us this: that type of
coalition doesn't work. In the case of the Gulf War, all it gave us was the
survival of a despotic madman with the capability to produce mass quantities of
chemical, biological (anthrax, anyone?), and perhaps even nuclear weapons.
Then, as now, the United States acted mostly to appease the al-Sauds; reaching
out to them was President George H.W. Bush's first instinct when Iraq invaded
Kuwait in August 1990. Bush, a blueblood who made his money in Texas crude,
shared a common denominator with the al-Sauds: oil. And he and his staff,
including National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, believed that if Iraq had
to be confronted, it would have to be done with a broad coalition that relied
heavily on moderate Arab states such as Saudi Arabia. "We needed to demonstrate
that this action was not a solo US effort against an Arab state," Scowcroft
wrote in his and Bush's joint memoir, A World Transformed (Alfred A.
Knopf, 1998).
The Saudis, then as now, didn't want too much chaos in the region. And that was
why, even as Bush ratcheted up the pressure on Iraq, he permitted Scowcroft to
signal a ray of hope for Saddam Hussein: in a September 10, 1990, interview
with BusinessWeek, Scowcroft hinted that Hussein would probably survive
the aftermath of the invasion. "Even Hussein can learn lessons," said
Scowcroft. He also reasoned that if Hussein were convinced that aggressive
behavior would not be tolerated, then it might not be necessary to keep massive
forces in the region.
As we all know, the coalition forces kicked Iraq out of Kuwait but left Saddam
Hussein, who has been stirring up trouble ever since -- flouting the UN
resolutions governing the end of the Gulf War, ejecting UN weapons inspectors,
repressing the Kurds, and possibly even worse. So much for lessons learned. In
the meantime, the United States still has a massive troop presence in the
region, and the Iraqi leader is believed to be preparing dangerous weapons to
use against the West -- if he isn't already behind the rash of anthrax attacks
that have infected two postal workers and killed two others. Richard Spertzel,
a former UN weapons inspector, told the New York Post and other media
outlets: "Iraq is the prime suspect as supplier."
It was and is the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia, the guardian of
the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina, that served as the nexus of bin
Laden's initial grievance against the United States. And Israel has nothing to
do with that. Still, keeping the Saudis happy means keeping Israel out of the
coalition -- just as it did a decade ago.
During the Gulf War, Israel was isolated in two ways. The first came during the
war, when Israel was attacked by SCUD missiles fired from Iraq and sought to
defend its citizens. It was prevented from doing so -- not by Iraq, but by the
United States. The American military refused to provide the Israeli Air Force
with the coalition codes its fighters needed to identify themselves as friendly
to the American jets patrolling overhead. To be sure, Israel could have
attacked the Iraqi SCUD launchers without those codes, but when it became clear
that the United States would not provide them, the Israeli government committed
itself to restraint. Bush's fear at the time was that if Israel and the United
States appeared to be on the same side of an alliance that was attacking Iraq,
the Arab world would see this as a war on Islam. Whether that's true remains an
open question -- one that we're still grappling with today.
The second slight came after the war, when Israel was pushed to the negotiating
table with enemies, such as Syria, who used the talks to great propaganda
value. Bush, Scowcroft, and Secretary of State James Baker had devised a plan
for a major Middle East peace conference in Madrid (an idea that actually made
sense given the dominant US position in the region following the Gulf War). But
Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Shamir, like Sharon today, was a hard-liner who
was disinclined to participate in a US-initiated peace process. So Bush
strong-armed Israel to the negotiating table by threatening to hold up
$10 billion in US-backed loan guarantees that Israel needed to help
resettle the wave of Russian Jewish immigrants who had arrived when the Cold
War ended. His decision to call for a four-month delay in action on the
loan-guarantee legislation coincided with a routine effort by the organized
Jewish community to lobby Congress on the same issue.
"I heard today there were something like a thousand lobbyists on the Hill
working the other side of the question," he thundered to a group of reporters,
according to J.J. Goldberg's book Jewish Power: Inside the American Jewish
Establishment (Addison-Wesley, 1996). "We've got one little guy down here
doing it." Bush's depiction of himself as one little guy arrayed against an
army of lobbyists was an outrageous play on the anti-Semitic myth that
Washington (and Hollywood and Wall Street -- pick your power center) are under
Jewish control. Indeed, the White House received a flurry of calls from
anti-Semites congratulating the president on his comments, Goldberg reports.
Bush subsequently apologized, but the damage was done. Enemies of Israel --
many of them enemies of freedom -- learned that they could get Bush to lean on
Israel.
ALL THAT would just be a bit of interesting history, if the current Bush
administration weren't in the process of repeating it. Exhibit A? Scowcroft.
Scowcroft was a mentor to two key foreign-policy figures in the current
administration: National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and the State
Department's director of policy planning, Richard Haass. Through Rice, and
through his continuing close relationship with the elder Bush, Scowcroft is
playing an influential role in George W. Bush's efforts in the Middle East, the
Washington Post reported October 1. He's also trying to sway public
opinion: America must "repeat the coalition-building of the Gulf conflict,"
Scowcroft wrote in an op-ed for last Tuesday's Post. "If anything we are
more dependent on friends and allies than we were in the Gulf crisis."
This is the equivalent of saying, "Never mind the mistakes I made a decade ago
-- I'll make them even more gloriously this time around." Following the
template created by Scowcroft and the first President Bush, the current
president and his administration are pressuring Israel into making concessions
to the Palestinians. This pressure continues despite the recent assassination
of the Israeli tourism minister, Rehavam Zeevi, by the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine. In a daily briefing last week, for example, a State
Department spokesman still stressed the "imperative of Israel exercising
restraint." In other words, after the PFLP assassinates an Israeli leader, and
Yasir Arafat refuses to crack down on the terror group, "terror must not be
allowed to divert the parties from continuing steps to put an end to the
violence," according to the State Department. The hypocrisy of this policy
alone -- the whole Bush war on terror is based on exactly the opposite
principle -- could cripple the entire struggle.
Of course, none of this should come as a surprise given the pro-Saudi bent of
Bush's father and Scowcroft -- and of so many within the current Bush
administration, including Haass and possibly Rice. (The notable exceptions are
said to include Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of
defense; Lewis
"Scooter" Libby, Cheney's chief of staff; and possibly Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld.) The Wall Street Journal reported September 27 that the
president's father, former secretary of state James Baker III, and former
secretary of defense Frank Carlucci have business links not just to the Saudi
regime but to a company connected to the bin Laden family. According to the
Journal, the elder Bush advises and has made speeches on behalf of the
Carlyle Group, a Washington merchant bank in which the bin Laden clan is a
major investor. If there were any doubt about the former president's
involvement in Middle Eastern matters, it should have been put to rest this
summer. In a July 15 story headlined BUSH SENIOR, ON HIS SON'S BEHALF,
REASSURES SAUDI LEADER, the New York Times reported that Bush still
relies on his father when it comes to the Middle East. Apparently Crown Prince
Abdullah of Saudi Arabia was irked that the younger Bush had until then taken a
hands-off approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Bush was in the room,
but silent, when the former president telephoned the Saudi. "The president's
heart is in the right place," Bush's father reportedly assured the Saudi
prince.
Yet after all this deference toward the Saudi regime and its concerns, the
Saudis have not exactly rushed to reassure the Arab world that the campaign
against Afghanistan does not represent a Western jihad against Islam. First,
the Saudis refused America the use of their air bases on the Arabian peninsula.
Then, they condemned America's bombing campaign in Afghanistan. "We wish the
United States had been able to flush out the terrorists in Afghanistan without
resorting to the current action . . . because this is killing
innocent people," said Saudi interior minister Prince Naif. "We are not at all
happy with the situation."
Given American reliance on oil, it's a lot easier to pressure our ally, Israel,
at the behest of Saudi Arabia than it is to ask serious questions about the
corrupt Saudi regime. Why did the Saudis pour millions if not billions of
dollars into Islamic charities that transfer money to bin Laden? Why do the
Saudis remain so uncooperative about the prospect of war in the region?
Finally, why do the Saudis continue to fund the Islamic schools in Pakistan
that fuel pro-bin Laden and pro-Taliban sentiment? Indoctrination in hate and
suicide bombing is a much more fundamental cause of terrorism than any alleged
American misdeeds.
Speaking on NBC's Meet the Press on Sunday, Senator John McCain of
Arizona accused the Saudis of "playing . . . kind of a double game
here." He said: "They're kind of trying to have it both ways." His fellow
guest, Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut, took McCain's words a step
further. "We can't tolerate a nation like the Saudis, whose government, in many
ways, continues to stand because we support them, to promulgate that hatred."
But Bush's current focus -- away from Saudi Arabia and onto Israel -- plays
into exactly the same duplicitous game the Saudi regime has used for years to
divert attention from itself. The more effort the Bush administration puts into
forging a peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians during the war on
terrorism, the greater the chance that the US will be distracted from the real
goal: bringing terrorists to justice. Just as they did during the Gulf War, the
Saudis have created a trap -- one that could lead to less-than-total victory.
With 6000 Americans already dead and more deaths surely on the way, that would
be tragic.
Seth Gitell can be reached at sgitell[a]phx.com.
Issue Date: October 26 - November 1, 2001